European party families and their “bad apples” – Why are they so reluctant to take action against member parties responsible for democratic backsliding?

Abstract

European party families play an important role in assessing the issue of democratic backsliding in the European Union (EU): Party-political dynamics have been identified as one key reason for the EU being unable to effectively tackle democratic backsliding, because most member state governments responsible for backsliding are members of a European party family. We ask why Europarties and their groups in the European Parliament are so reluctant to take tougher action against their member parties that pursue democratic backsliding at the national level. By conducting 16 interviews with party representatives from the European People’s Party, the Party of European Socialists, and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, as well as with external political observers, we qualitatively examine the strategic and ideological factors that party representatives consider when deciding on measures against backsliding member parties. We find that power-political calculations in the European Parliament, low reputational costs, tolerance for anti-democratic values, and a critical stance towards EU integration are key factors. They can be found in all three Europarties, however some elements are more strongly emphasized by representatives from the European People’s Party. Our findings are important for deepening the understanding of responses to democratic backsliding by EU institutions and European political parties.

Keywords: European Union; democratic backsliding; rule of law; European political parties; authoritarian equilibrium

1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) is in a rule of law and democracy crisis: Member state governments – most notably the Fidesz government in Hungary (since 2010) and the PiS government in Poland (since 2015) but also governments in Romania (2017-2019) or the Czech Republic (2017-2021) – have continuously undermined the rule of law, checks and balances to the executive, freedom rights, the protection of minorities and even fair elections (Bakke and Sitter 2022; Hanley and Vachudova 2018; Hassel and Kolb 2019)(Bakke and Sitter 2022; Hanley and Vachudova 2018; Hassel and Kolb 2019)(Bakke and Sitter 2022; Hanley and Vachudova 2018; Hassel and Kolb 2019). These developments are defined as ‘democratic backsliding’ by many scholars (Sitter and Bakke 2019, 5 ). At the same time, the EU has not made great use of the tools it has at its disposal to address these kinds of violations (Kelemen 2020; Kelemen and Blauberger 2017; Kochenov and Pech 2016; Sedelmeier 2017a)(Kelemen 2020; Kelemen and Blauberger 2017; Kochenov and Pech 2016; Sedelmeier 2017a)(Kelemen 2020; Kelemen and Blauberger 2017; Kochenov and Pech 2016; Sedelmeier 2017a)(Kelemen 2020; Kelemen and Blauberger 2017; Kochenov and Pech 2016; Sedelmeier 2017a).

There is a growing body of literature that discusses the political reasons that might explain the persisting inaction on behalf of the EU. While there seem to be some “institutional logics” (Closa 2021, 501 ) at play that differ from one institution to another, scholars have identified a set of arguments put forward by a broad range of actors. On the one hand, these are strategic considerations often inspired by party politics that keep EU decision-makers from taking tough(er) action against backsliding member states due to their political interests (Kelemen 2020, 483, 487 ; Sedelmeier 2014, 119 )(Kelemen 2020, 483, 487 ; Sedelmeier 2014, 119 ). On the other hand, an important share of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) or member state representatives in the Council have ideological preferences on democracy or European integration that are quite in line with those of the backsliding governments (Closa 2021, 511 ; Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 184 ; Meijers and van der Veer 2019, 847 )(Closa 2021, 511 ; Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 184 ; Meijers and van der Veer 2019, 847 )(Closa 2021, 511 ; Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 184 ; Meijers and van der Veer 2019, 847 ).

Drawing on this literature, this paper focuses on a specific aspect of the EU’s lack of political will to effectively counteract democratic backsliding that has not yet been researched systematically. While it is already puzzling that the EU as an international organization founded on the values of democracy and the rule of law tolerates backsliding among its member states, it is normatively even more striking that even European party families like the European People’s Party tolerate parties like Fidesz in their ranks. We therefore ask why European party families, i.e. the Europarties and their parliamentary groups in the European Parliament, are generally very reluctant to take tougher action against their member parties and delegations that pursue democratic backsliding while being in power at the national level. For this purpose, we adopt a qualitative approach that builds upon elite and expert interviews with party representatives to better understand how they balance different arguments to either support or oppose action against member parties and their respective governments.

This article finds that both strategic calculations and ideological preferences explain the reluctance of European party families to take tougher action against backsliding member parties. Moreover, the two types of factors strongly interact, and they even mutually reinforce themselves as, in particular, less pro-democratic party representatives tend to tolerate democratic backsliding due to strategic considerations. Additionally, the ideological support for democratic backsliding as well as the opposition to EU interference in the domestic affairs of member states are more prominently pronounced by party representatives of the European People’s Party (EPP) than by other parties. Thanks to the qualitative-oriented design of this article, it contributes in three ways to the literature on democratic backsliding in the EU: First, by i.a. conducting background interviews with Members of the European Parliament (MEP) we gain an in-depth understanding of their reasoning on democratic backsliding and how to deal with the EU’s rule of law crisis. Second, we can confirm and qualify the different sets of arguments identified by quantitative research, draw links between various factors, and find additional arguments. Finally, we provide a comparative study of the motivations of three European party families in dealing with their backsliding national member parties. Thus, we can expose similarities and differences between the party families in how they approach democratic backsliding in the EU.

In the next section, we discuss the literature on the tools the EU has at its disposal to tackle democratic backsliding as well as on the reasons why the reactions have been rather half-hearted up to now. Then, we present our hypotheses concerning the three European party families that accommodate backsliding member parties, namely the European People’s Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES/S&D), and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE/Renew Europe). After shortly explaining the selection of interviewees and the use of methods, we present the empirical results and identify some additional explanations not covered by our set of hypotheses. The last section concludes and discusses ideas for future research.

2 EU responses to democratic backsliding in member states: the lack of political will to counteract illiberal tendencies

Most of the literature on the EU’s responses to democratic backsliding among its member states focuses on the tools that the institutions have at their disposal (Hellquist 2019; Kochenov and Bárd 2020; Kochenov and Pech 2016; Pech and Scheppele 2017; Scheppele and Kelemen 2020)(Hellquist 2019; Kochenov and Bárd 2020; Kochenov and Pech 2016; Pech and Scheppele 2017; Scheppele and Kelemen 2020)(Hellquist 2019; Kochenov and Bárd 2020; Kochenov and Pech 2016; Pech and Scheppele 2017; Scheppele and Kelemen 2020)(Hellquist 2019; Kochenov and Bárd 2020; Kochenov and Pech 2016; Pech and Scheppele 2017; Scheppele and Kelemen 2020)(Hellquist 2019; Kochenov and Bárd 2020; Kochenov and Pech 2016; Pech and Scheppele 2017; Scheppele and Kelemen 2020). These instruments, ranging from dialogue-based tools like the Rule of Law Framework to rather coercive measures like the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation or Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, address the member state who is responsible for violations of the rule of law, democracy, or freedom rights (Sedelmeier 2017a, 338 ; Uitz 2019, 15 )(Sedelmeier 2017a, 338 ; Uitz 2019, 15 ). This article argues that this member state- versus EU-perspective has to be complemented by an additional dimension that focuses more on European party families and their member parties.

Drawing on Kelemen’s work (Kelemen 2017, 2020)(Kelemen 2017, 2020), we see that almost every member state government that has been engaged in democratic backsliding in recent times is led by a political party that simultaneously is a member of one of the three largest Europarties, EPP, PES, and ALDE.1 While these Europarties affirm their strong commitment to democratic norms and values (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 2018; European People’s Party (EPP) 2019; Party of European Socialists (PES) 2019)(Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 2018; European People’s Party (EPP) 2019; Party of European Socialists (PES) 2019)(Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 2018; European People’s Party (EPP) 2019; Party of European Socialists (PES) 2019), they seem to be tolerating democratic backsliding in their ranks as well. This is puzzling, especially as they also have a wide range of tools at their disposal to act against member parties who abandon democratic principles while being in power in their countries. These instruments include ‘soft measures’ like internal dialogue, and “naming and shaming” (Sedelmeier 2017b; von dem Berge and Poguntke 2013, 317–22 )(Sedelmeier 2017b; von dem Berge and Poguntke 2013, 317–22 ) as well as the suspension or exclusion of member parties (Kelemen and Pech 2019). Additionally, their political groups in the European Parliament (EPP, S&D, and Renew Europe) can make use of the same tools. Furthermore, the MEPs of these groups can support institutional action against democratic backsliding within the hemicycle as well.

In stark contrast to this wide range of tools, it took the EPP nine years following the accession to power of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and his government’s systematic undermining of democratic principles in the country to suspend Orbán’s Fidesz. From 2010 onwards, important EPP member parties like the German CDU and CSU have even publicly supported Orbán and his policies (Gathmann 2018; Kelemen and Pech 2019; Panyi 2020)(Gathmann 2018; Kelemen and Pech 2019; Panyi 2020)(Gathmann 2018; Kelemen and Pech 2019; Panyi 2020). Additionally, the suspension only removed the voting rights of Fidesz within the party committees without forcing the Fidesz MEPs to leave the EPP Group in the European Parliament (de la Baume and Bayer 2019). This was finally actualized only in 2021 when the group decided to amend its rules of procedure in order to be able to exclude an entire delegation. Fearing an upcoming exclusion, the Fidesz MEPs decided to leave the group themselves (Herszenhorn 2021). While the EPP-Fidesz relationship might be an extreme case, nearly the same dynamic has been at play concerning the Romanian PSD party, itself a member of the social democratic PES. Despite weakening anti-corruption legislation, undermining the independence of the judiciary, and inciting hate against the LGBTIQ* community since 2017, the PES only suspended its Romanian member party in 2019 in light of the approaching European elections (Becker 2019). Once more, the suspension exclusively concerned the Europarty, not the more powerful EP group.

Apart from material sanctions, we also notice a reluctance to exert public pressure on the backsliding member parties among all three Europarties: Neither the EPP vis-à-vis its Hungarian and Slovenian member parties, nor the PSD/S&D vis-à-vis its Maltese and Slovakian members, nor the ALDE/Renew Europe vis-à-vis their Czech member party voiced strong concerns on the violations of democratic norms taking place in these member states. The party family’s opposition to tougher action is best exemplified by the Maltese case: Despite generally supporting an EP resolution on the violations of the rule of law in the Mediterranean country, the members of the S&D Group successfully blocked a passage of the resolution calling for the use of the far-reaching Article 7 procedure against Malta (de la Baume 2019).

Therefore, the question arises why European party families are so reluctant to take stronger action against their member parties. As there is not yet any research explicitly focusing on party families and democratic backsliding, we turned to the literature working on the same question concerning the European institutions.

First of all, scholars seem to agree on the fact that the institutions are genuinely lacking the political will to counteract democratic backsliding (Pech and Scheppele 2017, 26 ; Sitter and Bakke 2019, 13 )(Pech and Scheppele 2017, 26 ; Sitter and Bakke 2019, 13 ). One line of reasoning focuses on the possible consequences of stronger action. Specifically, Commission officials and member state representatives either fear that the Union will disintegrate or that EU action will create a backlash in the targeted countries further supporting the parties who advocate for democratic backsliding (Emmons and Pavone 2021; Schlipphak and Treib 2017)(Emmons and Pavone 2021; Schlipphak and Treib 2017). Closa (Closa 2019, 2021)(Closa 2019, 2021) emphasizes the structural differences between the three institutions: While protection of party allies seems to be crucial in the EP, he identifies other reasons why the Commission (Closa 2019) and the Council (Closa 2021) prefer dialogue-based reactions to material sanctions. Whereas the Commission often fears that its authority would be undermined in case of non-compliance, member states tend to oppose sanctions if they a) do not want the EU to interfere in domestic constitutional affairs, b) are ideologically close to the targeted country, and c) fear to be targeted themselves in the future (Closa 2021, 511 ).

Interestingly, quite similar arguments also emerge in the Parliament, because voting in favor of or against a resolution on democratic backsliding is strongly linked to the ideological position of an MEP’s group (Wolkenstein 2021, 68 ). The two most important variables in this context are the commitment to liberal democracy and the view on European integration. Sedelmeier (2014, p. 119), Sedelmeier and Avdagic (Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 27 ) as well as Meijers and van der Veer (2019, p. 847) find that the strategic factor of party-political support is strongly mediated by these two ideological considerations. The less a political group or MEPs prioritize the values of liberal democracy and/or the more they oppose a deeper European integration, the higher the likelihood that MEPs of these groups vote against resolutions condemning democratic backsliding. In a recent study focusing on the European People’s Party, Herman et al. (Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 184–85 ) confirm that both the strategic and the ideological components influence the voting behavior of EPP MEPs (pp. 184-185). Additionally, they test for socio-structural variables that may affect MEPs in their voting behavior and found that coming from one of the four Visegrád countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) or being an MEP of a country with a low quality of democracy has a positive impact on voting against resolutions as well (Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 181 ).

Drawing on this growing body of literature, we can assume that similar arguments might be at play when it comes to discussions on party-political measures within European party families. However, the articles on the European Parliament analyze the broader voting behavior of MEPs concerning all recently discussed resolutions on democratic backsliding. Therefore, they cannot single out the possibly even more revealing question of party families being confronted with democratic backsliding of one of their very own member parties. By zooming in on each of the three Europarties dealing with this challenge, we want to unravel the complex set of arguments employed in this context. Moreover, we choose a qualitative approach in order to better understand the political mechanisms behind the different reasonings. By doing this, we follow a call issued by Herman et al. (2021) at the end of their paper on the EPP:

„Further research using qualitative analysis of debates on fundamental values and direct engagement with MEPs could serve to disentangle the respective role of strategic calculations and deeper forms of political learning [meaning: ideological considerations] in motivating EPP MEPs to support sanctions against fundamental values breaches from members of their own group” (Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 185 ).

3 Party politics and democratic backsliding: theorizing arguments for and against European party family responses to backsliding

Before developing hypotheses on the different arguments that have been introduced above, the possible reactions of European party families to cases of democratic backsliding conducted by one of their member parties are described in more detail. We agree with Herman et al. (Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 173 ) on the fact that Europarties and their political groups in the EP cannot be seen as monolithic blocs (p. 173). Hence, our unit of analysis will be individual party representatives and their position on the matter (see chapter on data and methods). Drawing on the literature on instruments against backsliding, one can assume that they can adopt the following three positions: 1) Party representatives oppose all kinds of action against member parties that engage in democratic backsliding; 2) party representatives generally support action but prefer so-called ‘soft measures‘ like policy dialogue, internal pressure, and public statements; 3) party representatives support action and make the case for material sanctions like the removal from important positions in Parliament, the withdrawal of voting rights, the exclusion of member parties, and the triggering of Article 7 or the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation.

In line with the literature on voting patterns in the EP in the context of democratic backsliding and the rule of law, we assume that there will be two main types of factors influencing the views of party representatives: one is based on strategic reasoning, the other relies more on ideological considerations. For each type of factor, we will present two hypotheses. As we will see in our findings section, far from being mutually exclusive, strategic and ideological reasoning strongly interact.

At the core of the strategic argument, we find the idea that Europarties and their EP groups do not have any interest in politically weakening or even losing a member party or delegation, because the bigger a European party, the more it can influence EU policy-making (Kaeding and Switek 2016; Raunio 2017, 363, 366 )(Kaeding and Switek 2016; Raunio 2017, 363, 366 ). Drawing on Kelemen (Kelemen 2020), we hypothesize that this equation generally applies unless the membership of the party accused of democratic backsliding creates any additional political costs for the party family. These costs can be twofold. Inside the European Parliament, national delegations might vote in opposition to the overall party line challenging the cohesion of the group and reducing its political impact. Although this is not often the case for mainstream party groups (Bowler and McElroy 2015, 1358 ; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007, 94 )(Bowler and McElroy 2015, 1358 ; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007, 94 ), there is some first empirical evidence for the EPP that the contestation within the party group has been on the rise in recent times, especially when voting on proposals related to democracy and the rule of law (Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 175 ). Moreover, tolerating backsliding parties might have consequences at the national level as well. If voters of a national party like the CDU are opposed to the party’s cooperation with parties like Fidesz at the European level, they might withdraw their support in the next elections (Kelemen 2020, 484 ). Perceiving such a form of pressure by the electorate might alter the strategic calculations as well. But as we see that Europarties are reluctant to take tough action, this article argues that the lack of both types of political costs may explain this reluctance. We therefore hypothesize the following:

If party family representatives consider the EP delegation of a backsliding member party to be important for the position of power of their political group in the EP, they are less inclined to support action against the respective party. (H1a)

The lower party family representatives estimate the reputational costs of working together with a backsliding member party, the less inclined they are to support action against the respective party. (H1b)

This reflects Kelemen’s (2020) idea of an “authoritarian equilibrium” (Kelemen 2020, 482 ) the European Union is trapped in due to the “half-baked politicization” (Kelemen 2020, 487 ) of its political system. Mainstream parties secure their position of power at the European level by relying on the votes of autocratic member parties without facing any reputational costs at the national level (Kelemen 2020, 483 ). Whereas the first part of Kelemen’s argument has largely been confirmed by earlier quantitative work, this article is the first one to empirically test its second part concerning the lack of politicization of democratic backsliding at the national level.

Joining a Europarty does not only rely on strategic interests but also on ideological sympathy with the other members. The closer parties are in their political preferences, the more likely they are to work together (Raunio 2017, 363 ). Concerning democratic backsliding, there are two ideological dimensions that quantitative research has identified as being of great relevance: the commitment to liberal democracy as well as the position on European integration (Sedelmeier 2014, 109–10 ; Sedelmeier 2017b, 6–7 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 7–9 ; also see Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021; Meijers and van der Veer 2019)(Sedelmeier 2014, 109–10 ; Sedelmeier 2017b, 6–7 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 7–9 ; also see Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021; Meijers and van der Veer 2019)(Sedelmeier 2014, 109–10 ; Sedelmeier 2017b, 6–7 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 7–9 ; also see Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021; Meijers and van der Veer 2019)(Sedelmeier 2014, 109–10 ; Sedelmeier 2017b, 6–7 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 7–9 ; also see Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021; Meijers and van der Veer 2019)(Sedelmeier 2014, 109–10 ; Sedelmeier 2017b, 6–7 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 7–9 ; also see Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021; Meijers and van der Veer 2019). Concerning the attitude towards liberal democracy, we can suppose the following according to (Sedelmeier 2017b, 6 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 7 )(Sedelmeier 2017b, 6 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 7 ): the less a party family representative is committed to liberal democratic values such as the guarantee of pluralism, fair political competition or strong control of the executive and the more open he or she is towards a concentration of power in the executive, the less is the support for action against democratic backsliding. We operationalize this ideological factor by the GAL/TAN cleavage between more green, alternative, and libertarian actors (GAL) that are more committed to liberal democratic values vs. more traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist actors (TAN) that are less committed to liberal democratic values (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002, 966 ). It follows that:

The more party family representatives support traditional, authoritarian, and/or nationalist positions, the less inclined they are to support action against backsliding member parties. (H2a)

Concerning the attitude toward European integration, we can assume the following according to (Sedelmeier 2017b, 7 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 8f. )(Sedelmeier 2017b, 7 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 8f. ): the more a party family representative is skeptical about supranational European integration (= Eurosceptic), the more he or she denies the legitimacy of the European level to tackle democratic backsliding in member states and considers this as an illegitimate interference into the internal affairs of member states. (Tougher) action is therefore susceptible to be rejected because people do not consider European party families to be legitimate actors to voice concerns on domestic constitutional affairs:

The more party family representatives support Eurosceptic positions, the less inclined they are to support action against backsliding member parties. (H2b)

Even though some articles include national variables (quality of democracy, vote share of populist-radical-right parties) in their models, we do not build any hypotheses on these elements as we do not have the resources to conduct the necessary number of interviews with party representatives from a broad range of member states. However, we have included some additional explanations based on inductive reasoning in the findings section that have proven to be strongly relevant to party representatives’ behavior.

4 Data and methods

In this article, we want to disentangle strategic calculations and ideological preferences of party family representatives regarding the question of how to deal with member parties responsible for democratic backsliding. To fully capture this complex process, we decided to conduct interviews with decision-makers and experts. Therefore, the most important methodological question concerns the selection of the interviewees.

The selection of interviewees mostly depends on the case selection. We analyze the party families of the EPP, the PES/S&D, and the ALDE/Renew Europe. They are the only party families that want to promote the democratic values enshrined in the EU treaties and simultaneously are home to member parties responsible for democratic backsliding. Since the Party of European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR) and the Identity and Democracy Party (ID) consist to a large extent of radical right-wing member parties who openly reject liberal-democratic values (Varieties of Democracy (V–Dem) Project 2022), it is not interesting to examine their stance towards backslider member parties as one can assume that they approve these policies anyway. Meanwhile, the Green party family (Greens/EFA delegation in Parliament), as well as the Left party family (GUE/NGL delegation in Parliament), do not have member parties responsible for democratic backsliding. Therefore, we focus on the EPP, PES/S&D and ALDE/Renew Europe party families.

In order to obtain information on strategic calculations and ideological preferences within the party families, we interview three kinds of people. The first type of interviewee are representatives of the party family who are either in favor or against (tougher) action against backsliding member parties. By interviewing these representatives, we try to capture the reasoning behind these opposing positions and thus want to understand to what extent the different positions on the independent variables explain the support for or the opposition to sanctions. (Former) MEPs are best suited for this type of interviewee because their general attitude can easily be retrieved from public statements and roll-call votes. The second type of interviewee are party family representatives who are experts on democracy and rule of law issues or have a comprehensive overview of the relations with member parties, as they are likely to know about the total range of arguments in favor or against sanctions. These experts are for example members of the EP’s LIBE-, CONT- or BUDG-Committee or (former) leading politicians of the respective party family. Finally, we have interviewed three external experts familiar with the internal debates to further validate the results. All in all, we have contacted about 40 potential interviewees of whom 16 have been available for an interview. We have mainly interviewed German and French party representatives, as they were most accessible to us due to language restrictions. It would have been an additional asset to control for the nationality of the interviewees, but such a research design would have required to increase the number of interviews to an amount difficult to manage within the context of this research project. Furthermore, even without controlling for national peculiarities, we can reach clear conclusions on how party representatives weigh up strategic and ideological calculations against each other. The interviews have been conducted from January to April 2021 (online); each interview has been about thirty minutes long. The list of interviewees is displayed in table 1 in an anonymized version, as the interviewees have wished.

Table 1: List of interviewees

To systematically analyze the interview transcripts, we employ Qualitative Content Analysis drawing on Mayring (Mayring 2019). Based on our hypotheses, we develop a set of categories that aim at representing each relevant line of reasoning. We then approach the material with these categories in mind helping us to single out the relevant parts of each interview by coding the transcribed interview texts. The basic version of this category system is presented in table 2.2

Table 2: Category system

5 Explaining European party families’ (in-)action against backsliding member parties

In the following, we present the results of our study. First, we set out which attitudes the interviewed party representatives have towards acting against backsliding member parties. Second, we explain which factors influence these attitudes, generally confirming our four hypotheses. Due to our qualitative method, we are able to identify more details on how these variables are actually expressed and weighed up by the party representatives, and whether there are differences in the reasoning of the three Europarties. Third, we present four additional arguments that we find in the data via inductive reasoning.

Party representative attitudes towards action against backsliding member parties

First, we find that attitudes towards action against backsliding member parties are different among the three party families. Interviewees from the S&D and the Renew Europe stress the necessity of social pressure significantly more than EPP interviewees. For S&D and Renew representatives, social pressure should be channeled in particular through strong internal and public criticism as well as resolutions of the European Parliament (H: 19/86, I: 70, J: 48, K: 102 for S&D; L: 20/218, M: 63/350 for Renew). In contrast, EPP representatives – though being generally in favor of dialogue and internal communication – place little or no emphasis on the aspect of social pressure. Expert interviewee P also observed that in the European Parliament, the S&D group is more open to social pressure against member parties than the EPP (P: 107). While the dependent variable greatly varies among the party families with regard to soft measures, no striking differences were found with regard to tough measures: In all three party families, we find positions tending to support material sanctions, such as suspension from the Europarty or exclusion from the parliamentary group, as well as positions generally rejecting material sanctions.

Fear of EP group weakening

Fearing a possible weakening of the party group’s position of power in the EP (H1a) is an important reason for party representatives of all three party groups to be critical of material sanctions against a backsliding member delegation. Especially EPP interviewees mentioned this argument referring to the large size and voting loyalty of the Fidesz delegation in the EPP group (B: 128/153, F: 52). Even EPP interviewee C, most strongly in favor of material sanctions, acknowledges: “And then it was clear that Fidesz was, of course, also quite important as a majority provider in parliament. I admit that here, too” (C: 35).3 Beyond the size and voting loyalty of the concerned delegation, we find two additional factors that the interviewees weigh up regarding the political power of their EP group. First, appreciating the personal working relationship with the colleagues of the concerned member party in most policy areas is another reason to view tough measures against them cautiously (D: 368 for EPP, K: 22 for S&D, M: 74/135 for Renew). This aspect plays a role for many interviewees of all three party groups and underlines the importance of the backsliding member party’s delegation for the work of the whole EP group. Second, the goal of having member parties from as many EU member states as possible in the group seems to be another power political argument that keeps MEPs from approving tougher measures, particularly emphasized by EPP and Renew Europe interviewees (M: 34/341).

Reputational costs due to public pressure

Furthermore, party representatives’ attitudes towards taking action are strongly influenced by the reputational costs they pay for being associated with a backsliding member party (H1b). Interestingly, we find that the interviewees understand a ‘loss of reputation’ as perceived public pressure by the media, citizens or political opponents, rather than in the sense of a concrete, direct loss of votes in elections as theorized by Kelemen (Kelemen 2020, 484 ). For interviewees of each party family, perceived public pressure is a motivation to support action against a backsliding member party. Fear of reputational costs was an important reason for many EPP interviewees to approve material sanctions against Fidesz (A: 196, B: 270/321, C: 304/346, D: 289/315/347; expert O: 54, expert P: 269) and has also been a reason for S&D and Renew Europe interviewees to support social sanctions against their PSD, SMER-SD, PL or ANO colleagues (I: 27/90, J: 44, M: 166/307). For instance, according to Renew Europe interviewee L, the German FDP delegation supported the EP-resolution criticizing Czech prime minister Andrej Babiš (ANO),

“because, of course, we don’t want to give the public the impression that we are applying double standards, because we stand for a clear position on the rule of law and thus, the guideline is sort of clear for us, that we don’t want people to say that the FDP is now voting against the ANO-resolution, because they are the same party, and they want to protect them. And they measure with double standards. Precisely because we do not do that, do not want this public perception to arise, we supported it in the end” (L: 218).4

However, several qualifications must be made in this context: First, most interviewees estimate overall public pressure and reputational costs to be rather low (E: 159, F: 218, G: 317 for EPP; H: 169/195/217, I: 166/187, K: 135 for S&D; L: 170, M: 297 for Renew) with the sole exception of some EPP interviewees in the specific case of Fidesz (B: 270/321, D: 289/315/347; expert O: 54, expert P: 252/269). This generally confirms Kelemen’s (2020) assumptions on low reputational costs for cooperating with backsliding member parties in Europe and also explains why measures have been taken so reluctantly (Kelemen 2020, 484 ).

Second, in contrast to the reasoning on political power, reputational costs are by no means perceived equally among all party representatives of a party family. Party representatives in high political positions and party representatives that are ‘experts’ in the field of democratic backsliding and rule of law perceive public pressure more strongly than others (J: 44, M: 166/307).

And third, for some EPP and S&D interviewees, reputational costs do not seem to influence their stance on measures against backsliding member parties: One S&D representative has supported material sanctions although he/she has estimated reputational costs to be low (H) whereas some EPP interviewees regret the measures taken against Fidesz although public pressure has been considered to be rather high in this case (E, F, G; expert O: 54, expert P: 252/269). We assume that in the S&D case, the relatively high GAL-orientation and/or pro-European stance of the concerned interviewees has outweighed strategic considerations on power politics and reputational costs. In the EPP case, the respective interviewees’ relatively high TAN-orientation or critical stance towards EU Integration may have trumped the reputational costs as well leading to opposition to tougher sanctions. This leads us to conclude that reputational costs might only influence the attitude of those party representatives who are ideologically closer to the center, i.e. people who do not represent extreme positions on EU integration or liberal democracy within their party families.

The attitude towards liberal democratic values (GAL/TAN)

Focusing on the ideological variables, we can indeed confirm that the attitude towards liberal democratic values does influence a party representative’s position towards measures against backsliding member parties (H2a): In all three party groups, some representatives are more tolerant of democratic backsliding and for whom democratic values have a lower priority than for other representatives of the same party family. This attitude always correlates with a more critical stance towards (tougher) action. On an absolute level, these critical positions are most pronounced in the EPP: Many interviewees stress that communication problems with Orbán and Fidesz have been the primary problem (A: 61, B: 143, D: 124/215, E: 8, F: 118). They thereby relativize democratic backsliding in Hungary and other member states (A: 162, F: 45, G: 209/326). Furthermore, many tolerate value differences within the EPP, or consider that democracy is just one issue among many others in international politics (B: 137, E: 124). Therefore, we consider that the absolute GAL-TAN level of EPP party representatives is decisively more TAN-oriented than in the S&D and Renew Europe groups. Nevertheless, some S&D and Renew representatives exist who do not prioritize democratic values or tolerate democratic backsliding (J: 96/135/156, M:135 (reporting on colleagues)) – albeit to a significantly lesser extent than in the EPP. This difference between the party families correlates with the expression of the dependent variable mentioned above: EPP interviewees emphasize the necessity of social pressure less strongly than the S&D and Renew Europe interviewees. We also find that ideological arguments often interact with strategic ones, as expected by the literature on the European Parliament (Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 185 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 23 )(Herman, Hoerner, and Lacey 2021, 185 ; Sedelmeier and Avdagic 2019, 23 ). Party representatives and national member parties representing more traditional, authoritarian, and/or nationalist values support their ‘ideological friends’ and reject (tough) measures against them in order to prevent possible future resolutions or measures directed against themselves (K: 211 (reporting on colleagues)).

The attitude towards EU integration

Finally, we can qualitatively confirm that the attitude towards EU integration influences the position on action against backsliding member parties (H2b): In all three party families, there are representatives and national member parties who are less pro-European than others, as they contest the legitimacy of the EU level (institutions and/or parties) to interfere in the ‘internal affairs’ of member states to counteract democratic backsliding. These party representatives are correspondingly critical of (tough) measures. Whereas all the S&D and Renew Europe interviewees have strongly pro-integrationist attitudes (H: 264/281/288, I: 243, J: 178/218/237, K: 331, M: 255) and only report from other less pro-European colleagues of their group (I: 24/120, K: 328, M: 176), we have interviewed several EPP representatives with critical views on EU integration (E: 30/36/231, G: 320). This position is best represented by F who explained his/her rejection of measures against Fidesz as follows:

“Everything that happens within Hungary was Hungary’s business. We were not going to interfere in certain problems. We had no lessons to give to Viktor Orbán on the governance of his country” (F: 42).5

Generally, attitudes critical of EU integration seem to be more strongly pronounced in the EPP than in the other two party families which also correlates with their reluctant attitude towards social pressure. We also find that some S&D and Renew Europe interviewees reject tougher measures despite their firmly pro-European attitudes (J). Therefore, only EU-sceptical attitudes might explain the reluctant reactions of European party families, whereas pro-European positions do not automatically lead to a tougher approach. Similar results can be found in Sedelmeier (Sedelmeier 2017b, 15 ), as he shows that pro-EU integration attitudes are only a necessary but not a sufficient condition to agree to resolutions (p. 15). Finally, as with the GAL-TAN variable, strategic calculations also interact with the EU variable: party representatives and national member parties reject EU interference in the domestic affairs of other parties and member states in order to prevent possible future resolutions or measures directed against themselves (E: 94, C: 21, I: 24/120 (the latter two reporting on colleagues)).

Additional explanations

Apart from the qualification of our four hypotheses, we find additional arguments in the data via inductive reasoning. These especially concern the interviewees’ perception of the case of democratic backsliding in question. First, if party representatives think the respective democratic backsliding is less severe than the backsliding in Hungary or Poland, they are more hesitant towards taking measures against the responsible member party (H: 61, I: 126/146, K: 61, M: 10). This is particularly true for very GAL-oriented interviewees, e.g. from S&D and Renew Europe, who otherwise make very clear that they do not want to downplay the democratic backsliding in question. Therefore, we assume that the level of democratic backsliding is an argument per se, regardless of the ideological preferences on liberal democracy.

Second, if party representatives differentiate between the national leadership of a member party responsible for democratic backsliding and the party’s MEPs in their group, they tend to be more reluctant in view of (tough) measures against the party. This differentiation is made by many interviewees, especially in the S&D and Renew Europe groups (H: 125, I: 39/149, K: 22/32/59, L: 39/55). For instance, S&D interviewee J highlights that

“the Romanian party was always divided into two camps, a pretty authoritarian, nationalistic camp and a very, how shall I put it, multicultural, international camp, and the representatives of this camp sat in the European Parliament. If we had kicked them out of the EP group, we would have weakened the intraparty opposition to the leadership in Bucharest, which you rightly criticized. That was one of the reasons why the Social Democratic group explicitly said they’re staying with us! To strengthen them in the intraparty power struggle in Romania. [...] But if you kick them all out, the bloc in Bucharest against which you are operating wins, so to speak” (J: 76.).6

Third, learning effects concerning the democratic backsliding in question do also influence the attitude of party representatives towards action. Some interviewees state that they have come to support tougher measures after learning more about the actual democratic backsliding taking place in the member state (C: 39, I: 98/155, K: 206) whereas others have come to reject (tougher) measures because of the very same reason (J: 156).

At last, some interviewees perceive a certain strategic ‘Eastern European solidarity’ inside their group where member parties from Eastern Europe support each other if one of them faces measures because of democratic backsliding (J: 117, expert O: 27).

Conclusion

Based on our qualitative analysis of interviews, we find that several factors contribute to the situation that European party families are reluctant to take action against backsliding member parties: fear that the group’s position of power in the EP might be weakened by taking tough action, low overall public pressure and reputational costs for being associated with the concerned parties, a certain degree of tolerance for democratic backsliding and lower prioritization of democratic values (more pronounced in the EPP than in the PES/S&D and ALDE/Renew Europe), as well as a certain degree of rejection of EU-interference in the domestic affairs of member states (likewise more pronounced in the EPP than in the PES/S&D and ALDE/Renew Europe). In addition to the confirmation and in-depth description of these arguments, we notice that the question of how party representatives assess the actual democratic backsliding in question does play an important role too.

These results shed light on how European parties deal with democratic backsliding in the EU. Although we did not integrate national variables into our hypotheses, we nevertheless observe that they do play a role. The most pronounced example is the one on ‘Eastern European solidarity’. However, it is uncertain whether all Eastern European member parties are against sanctions for democratic backsliding. For example, some interviewees mention that the Polish PO delegation has supported tough measures against Fidesz – especially based on their own experience as victims of democratic backsliding (P: 54). One might therefore ask if there is really some sort of ‘Eastern European solidarity’ within the three Europarties, or whether it is simply a strategic ‘TAN-solidarity’ or ‘Anti-EU solidarity’ pushed forward by those who want to tolerate democratic backsliding within their ranks. We see this question as a promising avenue for future research that might be investigated by specifically conducting interviews with Eastern European MEPs. Moreover, ‘national factors’ might include other aspects as well, most notably the role of member parties at the national level (government versus opposition), the national political situation (democratic backsliding versus no democratic backsliding taking place) as well as pressure from radical right parties.

Even though these remarks indicate that it is not possible to simply generalize the findings of this article for every party representative from the EPP, S&D/PES or ALDE/Renew Europe, this article provides an important first account of the arguments employed by party representatives to justify their inaction concerning the violations of democratic standards by some of their peers. Some of these arguments highly match the arguments used by EU institutions like the Commission or the Council (see lower prioritization of democratic values and rejection of EU-interference in the domestic affairs of member states), whereas some are specific to European party families (see political costs) underlining the fact that party politics plays a decisive role in explaining the EU’s lack of political will to counteract democratic backsliding.